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INTRODUCTION
It is often assumed that function is a fundamental concept in engineering design. This would mean that the design of a technical artefact is basically the design of a technical object that can fulfill a particular function, conceived of as what an artefact does (Akiyama, 1991; Ullman, 2002) , or the relationship that an artefact enables between available input and desired output (Otto and Wood, 2001; Pahl et al., 2007) . Various methods enable describing this overall function in terms of a set of simpler sub-functions for which components can then be designed, such as functional decomposition (Van Eck, 2011) or the functional basis model (Stone and Wood, 2000) . 1 Recently, however, the eminence of the function concept in engineering design has been challenged by Maier and Fadel (2009a) . In particular, Maier and Fadel argue that the abovementioned concept of function is too narrow to properly guide design: by focusing on processes that transform input into output, it cannot take into account non-transformative considerations in design, such as cost, maintenance requirements, aesthetics, etc. (cf. Vaesen, 2011) . In practice, such considerations are often grouped under the separate concept of constraints, or criteria that must be satisfied by a product and require consideration of the entire product to determine the criterion value (Otto and Wood, 2001, 151) . Maier and Fadel therefore propose an alternative focus for engineering design, namely the concept of affordances. Affordances are relational entities, depending on characteristics of artefact and user alike. Though definitions vary, I regard affordances here as opportunities for behaviour (cf. Pols, 2012) .
Affordance-based design has been quite successful in creating a space for itself in engineering design literature and practice, as witnessed by this special issue. It could even be 4 called a new design paradigm, in the sense that relations rather than processes form the basis of its ontology. However, the philosophical questions related to this new design paradigm have received little attention so far. For example, it is unclear whether affordances are really a more fundamental concept than functions in engineering design, or whether they themselves might depend on still more fundamental concepts. There is also little work on how affordances are related to functions (but see Brown and Blessing, 2005) , which impedes the translation of successful function-based design methods and techniques into affordancebased design and vice versa.
Interestingly, shortcomings of existing notions of technical functions have also been noticed by philosophers of technology. These philosophers have attempted to repair and improve the notion of technical functions in a project called The dual nature of technical artefacts (Kroes and Meijers, 2006) . Particularly, they argue that technical artefacts are characterised by having both physical and intentional/social characteristics (thus their 'dual nature'); that functions should be regarded as relational properties of artefacts (Meijers, 2000) ; and that function ascriptions are normative judgements (Franssen, 2006) : 'a good screwdriver' makes sense in a way that 'a good river' doesn't.
2 Some of these philosophers have nevertheless also called for a paradigm shift in the philosophy of technology: from a focus on the notion of function to one on the notion of action/use (Houkes and Vermaas, 2004) , and more particularly, use plan (Houkes et al., 2002; Houkes, 2006; Houkes and Vermaas, 2010) .
All these considerations raise a broader question in the philosophy of design, namely: how should we conceptualise, or describe, design? Is there one best way to conceptualise design, and if so, what would 'best' mean here? Or should different conceptualisations be used at different stages of the design process, or dependent on the kind of artefact that is to be 2 A river can be good for a certain purpose, e.g. for fishing, but the river does not have this purpose in itself. In contrast, a technical artefact is by definition designed for a certain purpose.
5 designed? As a full answer to these questions is beyond the scope of this paper, its more modest aim is to contribute to answering them by comparing three conceptualisations of the design process: the function-based approach, the affordance-based approach and the use plan approach, and identifying strengths and weaknesses of each.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section two I explain why the classical concept of function in engineering design is problematic and describe the proposed alternative conceptualisations of affordance-based design and the use plan approach. In section three I link Maier and Fadel's notion of 'affordances' to the notion of 'function' through the notion of 'use'. Basically, I argue that affordances can be understood as opportunities for use (see also Pols, 2012) , where the function of an artefact is the purpose that can be achieved by using it in a particular kind of way, namely rational proper use. Rational proper use is the kind of use for which an artefact has been designed (proper) and for which the user can justifiably expect that it can be used (rational). In section four, finally, I present my conclusions and recommendations for further research.
PROBLEMS WITH THE NOTION OF FUNCTION
Function, understood basically as the input-output relationship that a technical artefact realises (Otto and Wood, 2001; Pahl et al., 2007) , has long been a core concept of design theory. As a notion to guide design practice, however, it has various shortcomings. Maier and Fadel (2009a) argue that its most important one is its focus on transformative processes, at least in the domain of engineering. This focus is very useful for some parts of the design process, such as figuring out how artefact components should interact using functional decomposition methods (Van Eck, 2011 of wings, hearts, etc., and their change over the course of evolution. This has led to accounts of functions such as system accounts that define functions in terms of what organs and artefacts do, versions of which can also be found in engineering (Akiyama, 1991; Ullman, 2002 ). An example is Cummins (1975) , who holds that the function of a given part of a system is the role it plays in that system. However, Millikan (1984) and Neander (1991) (Preston, 1998; Vermaas and Houkes, 2006) .
In an interesting parallel, some design researchers also leave designer intentions out of their definition of function, rather using the term desired output (Otto and Wood, 2001; Ullman, 8 2002) . 3 Strictly speaking intentions have an advantage here over desires in that they are generally recognised as incorporating both desires and beliefs: I may desire my pen to enable me to travel at superluminal speeds, but I cannot intend to use or (re)design it for that purpose as I cannot reasonably believe that that is possible.
It should be noted here that others have taken the criticism of system and etiological theories of technical functions even further, arguing that technical functions depend partly or fully on social activity rather than on designer intentions (Scheele, 2006; Schyfter, 2009 ). Scheele argues, for example, that if a building is designed as a place of worship but at some point it gets used exclusively for holding semi-public events, this counts as changing the function of the building rather than as using it inappropriately. Thus, artefact functions can be changed by users, but this requires a prolonged change in the pattern of use rather than one or two instances of use for a different purpose. Crilly (2010) has noted that the term 'function' has, in different scientific fields, been applied to any artefact use for any purpose, including social, ideological and aesthetic purposes. This completely decouples functions from designer intentions, making 'function' almost as general as 'affordance'. 4 However, affordances can also refer to how an artefact can affect an agent or another artefact in a way that is unintended and/or serves no one's purpose ('this huge car affords frustrating bikers'), something that according to Crilly is not covered by most function definitions.
Irrespective of whether one comes at this discussion from engineering or philosophy, one can safely conclude that (transformative) function-based design tends to be too narrow and fails to consider the importance of designer and user intention and physical and social context. In the next section I examine two proposals for alternative conceptualisations of the design process: affordance-based design (Maier and Fadel, 2009a) and use plans (Houkes and Vermaas, 2004, 2010) . I compare these alternatives to function-based design in a number of aspects. I argue that, though there may not be a 'best' way of doing design, use plans seem a more fundamental concept in the design process than affordances and functions, and that each approach has particular strengths and weaknesses.
Affordance-based design
Maier and Fadel claim that design should abandon the transformative function concept and adopt a central concept that is essentially relational. Rather than developing a new concept or working out a function concept that is not necessarily transformative, they use the concept of affordances from the psychology of perception (Gibson, 1979 ) that has been made popular in the design world by Norman (1988 Norman ( /2002 (Warren, 1984) . Similarly, whether an artefact is maintain-able, afford-able, etc. depends on properties of the system and technical and financial capacities of the user. Thus, the notion of affordances draws designers' attentions much more towards the capacities of the intended users than the transformative function concept does.
Though in an earlier paper I have used a more narrow definition of affordances as opportunities for action (Pols, 2012) , I will extend this here to the broader opportunities for behaviour to match the definition of Maier and Fadel. In the narrow definition, 'action' is a particular kind of behaviour that requires an intention on the part of the agent. Thus, only agents can make use of opportunities for action, though those opportunities can be offered by artefacts and by other agents, such as the opportunity to strike up a conversation. In the broad definition, 'behaviour' can be exhibited by both agents and artefacts when an opportunity is offered by either an agent or an artefact. The broad definition thus includes artefact-user affordances (Maier and Fadel 2009a) , which can be opportunities for behaviour an artefact offers a user or vice versa; and artefact-artefact affordances, such as a cog that affords rotation by another cog (ibid.).
One salient result from replacing functions with affordances as the core concept of design is that it does not so much remove the weakness of the function concept, its narrow focus on transformative considerations, but replaces it with another weakness. This is because affordances on their own cannot differentiate between those that fulfill core and those that fulfill contingent design requirements, and those that are irrelevant or problematic for design requirements. To borrow an example from Maier and Fadel: a chair might afford sitting (core), stacking (contingent) and throwing (irrelevant) to a user, but there is no principled way to prioritise one over the other the way the function concept does ('the function of this chair is to allow/enable sitting.'). Maier and Fadel define design in terms of specifying a system structure that possesses certain desired affordances and does not possess certain undesired affordances. This means that, if throw-ability is neither desired nor undesired, it does not have to be considered during design. (Indeed, any artefact will have many affordances that are neither particularly desired nor particularly undesired.) Sit-ability and stack-ability, however, both count as desired affordances for the chair. An advantage of this is that the list of desired affordances defines a general 'problem space' for the designer to explore. A disadvantage is that the designer cannot distinguish between core and contingent design requirements (without extending the design framework), and thus has no clear way forward in dealing with conflicting requirements or communicating product information to 11 the user. Sure, the designer knows her product is a 'stackable chair' rather than a 'sit-able stacker', but this distinction is not recognised by affordance-based design, according to Maier and Fadel's definition.
I now examine a second alternative to function-based design, namely use plan-based design, and compare it with affordance-based design.
The dual nature of technical artefacts and use plan-based design
The use plan account is based on the observation that both 'design' and 'use' of artefacts are forms of human action. Drawing on philosophical analyses of actions (Anscombe, 1957 (Anscombe, /2000 Davidson, 1980) , making this observation implies that we can already establish some characteristics of both design and use, e.g. that they are done for reasons, have goals and are preceded by intentions. The use plan account claims that the fundamental activity in design is not so much design of functions or affordances, as well as design of actions, or more generally, design of plans that are 'orderings of considered actions, undertaken for a goal.' (Houkes et al., 2002, 304) .
The concept of a plan is more fundamental in design than the concept of affordances, in the sense that it is where the design process starts. In principle, the design process has to start with a goal or a desired state of affairs, otherwise there is no reason to start a design process at all. 5 The design process is then essentially, though not always explicitly, the creation of a plan to achieve that goal. The notion of 'desired affordances' works to guide the design process because it implicitly implies the existence of a goal and plan: affordances only become desired when the designer has a notion of how, and for what end, the artefact should 12 be used. 6 In short, affordances become desired in relation to an (envisioned) use plan. Note that this does not mean that the use plan approach is somehow 'better' or 'more useful' than affordance-based design in informing actual design practice. Rather, it can serve as a theoretical explanation of what makes some affordances 'desired'. Nor does it mean that goals and plans are set in stone. All kinds of factors, including the discovery of (un)desired affordances, may lead to changes in plans and even goals.
The use plan account has been elaborated upon in various publications (Houkes and Vermaas, 2004, 2010) and has been used to, for example, examine use know-how (Houkes, 2006) and how designers can transfer moral responsibility for artefact use to users (Pols, 2010) . It is important to establish here that the use plan account is a rational reconstruction of what a vital part of the design process should look like rather than a concrete step-by-step account.
Thus, the use plan account focuses on more abstract steps (construct plan, evaluate whether the client's goal is obtained by executing this plan...), leaving open which practical means are best suited for taking these steps (e.g. user interviews, experimental studies...) (Maier and Fadel, 2009b) . This also means that use plans can deal with maintenance and recycling, by including the relevant actions or sub-plans, but do not prescribe engineers how to deal with practical limitations such as cost and scarce resources.
A use plan is not a relational entity like an affordance, but is still crucially dependent on properties of both artefact and user for successful execution. It allows a decomposition of the plan into actions needed to achieve the goal with the artefact not unlike functional decomposition. For example, a plan to phone a friend can be decomposed into a sequence of actions including pressing buttons and holding the phone to your ear (Houkes et al., 2002; Pols, 2012) . 
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An advantage of focusing on actions and plans is that these concepts are explicitly normative.
For example, actions can be criticised if they are not in accordance with the goals or intentions of the agent, as when I claim that I intend to finish my paper today while all I am doing is playing computer games. Actions and plans share this normativity with the function concept: my claim that this is a good pen may be criticised if it is actually impossible to write with. Desires or desired affordances are more difficult to evaluate in this way: it is perfectly possible that I desire to play computer games and desire to finish my paper within the next hour. I just cannot intend to do both, as I do not believe I can do so.
In particular, the use plan approach elaborates two normative aspects of plans: whether they are rational or not, and whether they are proper or not. A use plan is rational if its designer justifiably believes that executing the series of actions constituting the plan will lead to the realisation of the plan's goal. A use plan is proper if it is the plan the artefact was originally designed for (Houkes, 2006) . Similarly, artefact use is rational if the user justifiably expects that the artefact can be used in that way, and proper if that is the kind of use for which the artefact has been designed. The rationality and properness of use plans can be combined in the categorisation in Table 1 .
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
The use plan approach stresses that constructing a use plan is only part of the design work.
The other part is communicating the plan to the user, together with any information that the user might need in order to successfully execute the plan. 7 Houkes and Vermaas write that 'in 7 Constructing the artefact according to use plan specifications is rather manufacturing than part of the design process.
14 a rational plan, the user believes that the selected objects are available for use -present and in working order -that the physical circumstances afford the use of the object, that auxiliary items are available for use, and that the user herself has the skills necessary for and is physically capable of using the object ' (2004, 59) .
A difficulty in applying the use plan approach in practice is that it is a rational reconstruction.
As such, its purpose is rather to be an accurate description of an abstract, ideal design process than a practical guide to product design. This does not mean that it cannot give practical recommendations, but due to its focus, its prescriptions may be relatively abstract and it is strongly dependent on the rationality and responsibility of the user, requiring only that the plan is communicated clearly. Both practical and theoretical developments in affordancebased design, in contrast, have often been motivated by their potential to contribute to actual design processes. One aspect in which this difference in focus can be seen is the emphasis of affodance-based design's recommendations for making design 'idiot-proof' by avoiding or removing undesired affordances. For example, a household ladder of which the horizontal brace contains a sign stating 'this is not a step' would qualify as rational design according to the use plan approach. If the brace affords stepping, however, it would count as an undesired affordance and thus be lacking according to affordance-based design (Maier and Fadel, 2009a, 25) .
A structured overview of the different features of function-, affordance-and use plan-based design can be found in Table 2 .
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. (ORIGINALLY LANDSCAPE LAYOUT).
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFFORDANCES AND FUNCTIONS
In order to show how functions, affordances and use plans are related I will first link functions to use in section 3.1. I will then link use to affordances in section 3.2 using my own work on affordances (Pols, 2012) .
Function and rational proper use
The use plan account differentiates between different kinds of artefact use. Of these, 'rational proper use' is the counterpart of the classical function concept. The function of a screwdriver is to tighten screws: this is the purpose that can be realised with it by the kind of use for which it is designed (proper); and the purpose for which the user can justifiably expect that it can be used (rational). A designer can describe in different ways how a screwdriver works.
The kind of description that is useful differs depending on who is addressed and what they need to know: a description for creating a functional basis model might focus on energy conversion and how torque is transmitted from the user's hand to the screw's head. A use plan description might rather focus on the series of actions the user needs to take with the screwdriver in order to end up with a tightened screw. Both descriptions are valid and differ ultimately only in focus. This translation of functions into use plans highlights why many classical function-based accounts of design fail to take into account user, physical and social context: they focus on the properness part of functions (e.g. the purpose of a system or its desired output) but neglect their rationality part: under what circumstances the artefact is actually usable according to its function. This includes considerations of who the users are, how they have to interact with the artefact, and whether they have the ability to do this in the 'right' way. If we want to take this into account, we can define the function of an artefact as the purpose that can be realised with its rational proper use.
It should be noted, however, that some function-based accounts do take the rationality part into account. Chandrasekaran and Josephson's (2000) 'function as effect', for example, defines functions as roles + intentions (p. 14). This is remarkably similar to the use plan's definition of rational proper use: the role or mode of deployment of an artefact determines what it can be used for in certain environments by certain users (rationality), the intention serves to distinguish intended from accidental or unintended use (properness). Thus, while it is a virtue of the use plan account that its definition of function takes both rationality and properness into account, it is not the only (possible) way to do so.
Use as acting on an opportunity for use
Use, and more generally, action, are broad concepts: they can be interpreted as anything ranging from simple manipulations to complex and prolonged activities. Consequently, if we define affordances as 'opportunities for action', we have to be quite specific about what actions are if the concept is to be usable in design. When Gibson (1979) worked out what affordances are, he referred to directly perceivable 'opportunities for manipulation' such as grasping or standing on. However, since then various new kinds of affordances have been introduced (e.g. Gaver 1991; Hartson, 2003) .
In an earlier paper (Pols, 2012) I have argued that actions can be described on different levels, for example, when I brighten the room by turning on the light by flipping the switch by moving my hand, and that affordances can similarly be described on different levels. This yields a fourfold classification of affordances as manipulation opportunities (the Gibsonian affordances, opportunities for simple physical manipulations such as flipping a switch), effect opportunities (opportunities to bring about a certain effect by manipulating an affordance, such as turning on the light), use opportunities (executing a plan of an artefact by performing a series of actions, or using the artefact for its function, such as brightening the room) and possibly activity opportunities (opportunities to give your behaviour meaning in a social context, such as creating a cozy atmosphere).
This account can be extended to behaviour in general as any behaviour, doings and happenings of agents and artefacts, can be described on different levels. For example, we can say that a security alarm protects a house by detecting burglars by monitoring motion in specific rooms. This is implicitly incorporated in the use plan approach, where executing a use plan can include instructions for the user to wait while the artefact exhibits particular behaviour. For example, once activated, a security alarm requires no further input from the user unless the alarm goes off or the user wishes to deactivate the alarm. Brown and Blessing (2005) incidentally present a similar structure for functions: a pen can be said to have the (environment-centric) function of writing by having the (environment-centric) function of causing a piece of paper to have ink on it by having the (device-centric) function of causing ink to flow out of its ink container onto its tip. Here, the artefact's behaviour presupposes particular human actions, while the use plan approach does the opposite. As with action descriptions, in this structure there is no 'correct' or 'true' function description, though different descriptions may serve different practical purposes: all are equally valid, with the caveat that the action or function, under that description, must be intended by the designer.
Otherwise it is not an (intended) function but simply (unintended) artefact behaviour.
If we describe actions, affordances and artefact behaviour on different levels, 'executing a use plan' is the same as acting on a particular kind of affordance, namely, a use opportunity of an artefact. Given that a use plan is 'a considered series of actions undertaken for a goal', a use opportunity can be regarded as an opportunity for a considered series of actions on manipulation opportunities (Gibsonian affordances), which may or may not include waiting for the artefact to exhibit particular behaviour, to achieve a goal. This yields us the following,
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arguably unwieldy, definition of artefact functions in terms of Gibsonian affordances: The function of an artefact is the purpose that may be realised with it by executing a rational and proper series of considered behaviours on affordances of that artefact.
For example, if the function of a screwdriver is to tighten screws, then the screwdriver should support one or more affordances (grasp-ability, turn-ability). The rational and proper series of behaviours on those affordances leads to or constitutes a particular kind of use, namely that of screw-tightening, thus achieving the purpose of tightening screws. What makes this series of behaviours proper is that the user undertakes it for the same use as the designer intended it to be taken. What makes the series rational is that the user justifiably believes that, given the design of the artefact, her skills and the physical and social context, successful execution of the series of behaviours is possible and will lead to or constitute proper use. By replacing 'action' in the definition of use plans with 'behaviours (on affordances)' the definition allows for artefact-artefact affordances and can also handle (sub)functions of artefacts that operate without user interaction, as long as their operation is part of some overall goal or use.
In the final section I draw my conclusions and give three recommendations for further research into conceptualising the design process.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The notion of technical function has come under critical scrutiny from both design researchers and philosophers. Design researchers have argued that the notion is too narrow to properly guide the design process, which requires dealing with many non-functional factors such as cost and maintenance. 8 Brown and Blessing (2005, 5 ) make a similar analysis of ways in which design may go wrong. They distinguish another possibility, where the use plan may be rational and proper but not desired by the user, and thus count as a design failure. (Ullman, 2002) "The general input/output relationship of a system whose purpose it is to perform a task" (Pahl et al., 2007) "what [the environment] offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill" (Gibson, 1979, 127) .
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"what one system provides to another system" (Maier and Fadel 2009a, 19) .
"Opportunity for action" (Pols, 2012, 113) "Orderings of considered actions, undertaken for a goal" (Houkes et al., 2002, 304) Kind of concept Transformational; relation inputoutput, though other proposals have been made (Crilly, 2010) .
Relational; property of two systems (e.g. artefact and user).
Constitutive; series of actions.
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Dependent on form? No, a function can be realised by multiple forms.
Partly; a change in form will change (the quality of) the affordance, but some affordances can be instantiated by a wide variety of forms, e.g. liftability, pushability.
No, a use plan can be realised by multiple forms.
Role of designer intention
Determines function. Determines which affordances are (un)desired.
Determines which use plan is proper.
Role of user and
context -Co-constitutive: affordance depends on artefact and user.
Relevant user skills and/or contextual features that affect the viability of the use plan need to be communicated for rational proper use.
Decomposition possible?
Yes; functional decomposition (Stone and Wood, 2000; Van Eck, 2011) , but see Vermaas (2013 
